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A.

ARGUMENT
This case requires the Supreme Court to interpret a statutory scheme, the Worker's

Compensation Law ("Law"), that compels employers to compensate their employees for
injuries or disease incurred in the course of their employment and, in cases of total and
permanent disability where an employee's pre-existing injury or medical condition combines
with a new injury or disease to render her totally and permanently disabled, obligates the
Industrial Special Indemnity Fund ("ISIF") to compensate the employee for total and
permanent disability.
ISIF asks this Court to interpret the Law in a way that allows it to avoid its statutory
obligation to fully compensate injured workers for total and permanent disability by entering
into lnmp snm settlements in disputed cases in which ISIF denies the claimant is totally and
permanently disabled, as it did here. Such agreements reflect Jong-standing practice but are
contrary to the careful wording of the relevant provisions of the Law.

1. The Lump Sum Settlement Agreement between Ms. Wernecke and ISIF is
void under Idaho Code§ 72-318(2).
This case turns on the Court's interpretation ofidaho Code§ 72-318(2). ISIF
contends, erroneously, that this Court "has clearly stated that § 72-318 only prohibits an
agreement by an employee to relieve an employer of an obligation that the employer has
because of tl1e worker's compensation Jaws." Respondent's Brief, p. 8 (emphasis in
original): The cases ISIF cites, Osick v. Public Employee Ret. Sys., 122 Idaho 457, 835 P.2d
1268 (1992) and Burdick v. Thornton, 109 Idaho 869, 712 P.2d 570 (1985), don't support this
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contention.
Both Osick and Burdick deal only with the first subpart of§ 72-318, which prohibits
an employer from entering into an agreement with its employee that relieves the employer
from its obligations under the Law. It is the second subpart,§ 72-318(2), that is at issue here.
This section prohibits any agreement, not just an agreement with the employer, by which an
employee waives her rights to compensation under the Law. "No agreement by an employee
to waive his rights to compensation nnder this act shall be valid." Idaho Code§ 72-318(2).
ISIF has no answer for Ms. Wernecke's contention that if§ 72-318(2) is held to apply
only to agreements between employees and employers, and not to agreements with, for
instance, ISIF, it is mere surplusage. Contracts between employers and employees are
specifically addressed in § 72-318(1), which prohibits any agreement "or any contract ...
designed to relieve the employer in whole or in part from any liability created by this Jaw."

In adding § 72-318(2), the legislature evidently thought it needed to address not just
agreements or contracts with employers, but any other agreement by an employee to waive
her rights to compensation. And so it did.
Nor does ISIF even attempt to convince this Court that its lump sum agreement with
Ms. Wernecke was somehow not a waiver of her rights to compensation for total and
permanent disability. Instead, it appears to contend that ifthere was consideration for the
waiver, all is well and there's no violation of§ 72-318(2). Its argument goes essentially like
this: "We denied Ms. Wernecke was totally and permanently disabled but we paid her
$6,500 anyway. She accepted our money, signed the Jump sum agreement waiving her right
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to ever sue us again, and she's stuck with it. A deal is a deal." What ISIP can't get past,
however, is that the "deal" is prohibited by§ 72-318(2) and it's invalid; it's void. 1 (ISIF
acknowledges that it isn't an employer, Respondent's Brief, p. 8, but doesn't recognize the
significance this has for its case. The Law, at § 72-404, only allows employers to discharge
their liability for total and permanent disability by lump sum payment, the common practice
notwithstanding. ISIF's practice is thus contrary to the express language of the Law. If it
wants a change, it must go to the legislature.)
If this Court accepts that Ms. Wernecke's waiver was void, then the Industrial
Commission had no authority to approve it and its order is also void. See e.g. Martin v.
Soden, 81 Idal10 274, 285, 340 P.2d 848, 855 (1959) ('"If a court grants relief which under no

circumstances it has any authority to grant, its judgment is to that extent void."' (quoting Gile
v. Wood, 32 Idaho 752, 188 P. 36 (1920)). See also Hunter v. Superior Court of Riverside
County, 36 Cal. App. 2d 100, 113, 97 P.2d 492,499 (1939) ("If the contracts [in restraint of

trade] upon which the judgment is based are to that extent void, they cannot be ratified either
by right, by conduct, or by stipulated judgment.")
Moreover, '"[a] void judgment is a nullity, and no rights can be based thereon; it can
be set aside by motion or collaterally attacked at any time."' Andre v. Morrow, l 06 Idaho
1

Ballentine's Law Dictionary defines "invalid" as "illegal, having no force or effect
or efficacy; void; null." Ballentine 's Law Dictionary (3 rd ed. 1969). This Court uses the
words "invalid" and "void" seemingly interchangeably. See e.g. Nalder v. Crest Corp., 93
Idaho 744,750,472 P.2d 310,315 (1970) ("It is also fundamental that a writ of execution
based on an invalid or void judgment is also invalid.")
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455,459,680 P.2d 1355, 1359 (1984) (quoting Prather v, Loyd, 86 Idaho 45, 50,382 P,2d
910,915 (1963)); Burns v. Baldwin, 138 ldaho 480,486, 65 P.3d 502,508 (2003). These
cases are consistent with the Restatement (Second) ofJudgments, Section 80 (1982), which
provides that when, as here, a void judgment is relied upon as the basis of a defense in a
subsequent action, "relief from the judgment may be obtained by appropriate pleading and
proof in that action if other means of obtaining relief from the judgment are unavailable to
the applicant or the convenient administration of justice would be served by determining the
question of relief in the course of the subsequent action." Id
ISIF's contention that Ms. Wernecke should not be permitted to reopen the judgment
of the Commission, Respondent's Brief, p. 12, is therefore answered by this Court's
precedents; a void judgment can be collaterally attacked at any time.
2. If the Lump Sum Agreement and the Industrial Commission's Order are
void, Ms. Wernecke's claim based on her subsequent injury cannot be barred by res
judicata, waiver, or estoppel.

The doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata presuppose a valid underlying
judgment. If Ms. Wernecke's Agreement with ISIF and the Industrial Commission's
approval of it were invalid, the issue of whether she could ever again make a claim for
benefits against ISIF arising out of a future injury could not have been "conclusively
decided." Likewise, if the "final judgment on the merits in the prior litigation," Ticor Title
Co. v, Stanion, 2007 Ida. LEXIS 63, 157 P.3d 613,618 (2007), is void, Ms. Wernecke cannot

be precluded from raising the issue in her current claim.
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The case cited by ISIF in snpport of its collateral estoppel argument, Jackman v.

Industrial Specia!Indem. Fund, 129 Idaho 689, 931 P.2d 1207 (1997), does nothing to
advance ISIF's position. In Jackman, the Supreme Court held that the claimant was
collaterally estopped from bringing a claim against ISIF because he had taken an inconsistent
position in a lmnp sum agreement (approved by the Industrial Commission) between
claimant, the employer, and its surety. The validity of the underlying lmnp sum agreement
and of the Industrial Commission's order approving it were not at issue.
Nor can ISIF reasonably contend that the purpose of res judicata in protecting the
finality of an Industrial Commission decision is served by applying the doctrine to a void
judgment. The decision is a nullity; it can have no prospective effect.
With respect to ISIF's argmnents that Ms. Wernecke waived her right to make this
claim against ISIF and that it would be unconscionable to allow her to pursue it, Ms.
Wernecke simply reiterates that § 72-318(2) prohibits waiver of her right to compensation for
permanent and total disability. It is not unconscionable for her to rely on the statute.
Nor is it unconscionable, as ISIF suggests, for Ms. Wernecke to keep the $6,500 ISIF
paid her in 1994 and to now seek more if the 1994 Agreement was void. Interestingly, ISIF
doesn't try to convince this Court that $6,500 compensated Ms. Wernecke for total and
permanent disability, which it clearly didn't. She was only 42 years old, R. 59, and her life
expectancy was more than thirty years. The value of benefits for total and permanent
disability for the rest of her life was many times more than the smn ISIF paid her.
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Ms. Wernecke does not expect a double recovery. She fully expects that if this Court
allows her to bring her present claim against ISIF, and if she succeeds in convincing the
Industrial Commission that she is indeed totally and permanently disabled, ISIF's liability for
total and permanent disability will be properly apportioned under Carey v. Clearwater
County Rd. Dep't., 107 Idaho 109,686 P.2d 54 (1984) and it will be credited for the $6,500 it

has already paid.
3. Idaho Code § 72-324 does not allow ISIF's manager to settle claims by lnmp
sum agreement in cases where it denies liability.

ISIF argues strenuously that its manager is empowered under Idaho Code§ 72-324 to
adjust claims made against ISIF and to make agreements, including lump sum settlements,
with claimants like Ms. Wernecke. § 72-324 does not, however, say this and ISIF misreads
Ms. Wernecke's argument. Ms. Wernecke does not contend that ISIF should be entirely
precluded from entering into agreements with claimants or that it should be forced to litigate
every disputed claim. She simply contends, and a careful statutory analysis supports her, that
ISIF cannot settle claims with claimants whom it denies are totally and permanently disabled.
It is only when it denies liability that it will it be forced to litigate the issue.
The Drake case, cited at page 5 of Respondent's brief, involved exactly the kind of
agreement between ISIF and a claimant that Ms. Wernecke contends is appropriate and
contemplated by § 72-324. There was no dispute in Drake that the claimant was totally and
permanently disabled. ISIF admitted liability and the agreement it made with the claimant
simply dealt with the correct rate of compensation. Drake v. Industrial Special Ind.em. Fund,
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128 Idaho 880,881,920 P.2d 397,398 (1996). IfISIF accepts liability for total and
permanent disability, as it did in Drake, it is of course entitled under §72-324 to enter into
agreements resolving disputes relating to the correct wage rate and to structure payments
based on a claimant's life expectancy and needs.
What Ms. Wernecke challenges is ISIF's all-too-common practice of buying out of its
obligation to compensate for total and permanent disability when it denies the claimant is in
fact totally and permanently disabled. To allow this practice defeats the legislature's purpose
in creating the Industrial Special Indemnity Fund and subverts the policy expressed in Idaho
Code § 72-201. The Law exists to provide "sure and certain relief," § 72-201, and its
provisions "are to be liberally construed in favor of the employee." Sprague v. Caldwell
Transp., 116 Idaho 720, 721, 779 P.2d 395,396 (1989).
Finally, the fact that Ms. Wernecke was represented by another lawyer in the same
firm as her current lawyer has nothing to do with the issue before the Court, contrary to
ISIF's suggestion. If the 1994 Agreement and the Industrial Commission's order approving

it are void, it doesn't matter whether the lawyer who represented her at the time was across
the hall, across the street, or across town. Her current lawyer has not taken inconsistent
positions, and has certainly not employed tactics, as ISIP implies, calculated to gain an unfair
advantage for his client.

B.

CONCLUSION
If Ms. Wernecke's prior agreement with ISIP and the Industrial Commission's order

approving it are void, they cannot stand. And if, as Ms. Wernecke contends and hopes to
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prove to the Industrial Commission, she is totally and permanently disabled due to the
combined effects of her most recent injury and her pre-existing medical condition, the
Worker's Compensation Law requires that she be fully compensated. She should be
permitted to make her case to the Industrial Commission.
Respectfully submitted this ~ day of March, 2008.
LANDECK, WESTBERG, JUDGE & GRAHAM, P.A.

By:

tl/4 L- &d-

Charles L. Grahan1
Attorneys for Appellant
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